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Abstract
NLG systems that generate text from numerical data must de-
cide between alternative linguistic forms of the given numeri-
cal content, such as whether to use a precise or a vague expres-
sion. Currently there is little empirical data for these systems
to draw on when making these decisions. We performed ex-
periments with human readers in which participants responded
to instructions in the form of referring expressions, where we
manipulated whether the instruction used a vague or a crisp
referring expression, in order to test the hypothesis that vague-
ness reduces processing costs for the comprehender. Results
indicate that people respond more quickly and accurately to
vague linguistic expressions than to crisp numerical expres-
sions, but that this benefit also accrues to precise terms that
avoid numbers.
Keywords: referring expressions; empirical; vagueness; cost
reduction
Introduction
A working definition of vagueness Vagueness can be de-
fined at the level of the word (tall) or the referring expres-
sion (Bill is the tall guy over there). At the word level, we
consider that a word is vague if the set of objects that it de-
notes is not well-defined (Lipman, 2009). For example, tall
is a vague word because the set of heights that it denotes is
not well-defined. Support for this comes from the intuitive
observation that there are some heights for which it is not
clear whether the height is tall or not-tall. Keefe and Smith
give what can be regarded as a widely accepted definition
of vagueness: “vague predicates have borderline cases, have
fuzzy boundaries, and are susceptible to sorites paradoxes”
(Keefe & Smith, 1996). At the level of the referring expres-
sion, vagueness has to be defined in context. Referring ex-
pressions of quantity can be made at different levels of preci-
sion. Suppose, for example, that we and a friend are building
a table in a workshop, and we need our friend to pass us one
of two trays. One tray has 6 nails on it; the other tray is the
one that we need. We could express our request saying (a)
“Could you pass me a tray with n nails?”, where n is the cor-
rect number, or (b) “Could you pass me a tray with many
nails?” The first description uses an exact number. The sec-
ond description is less precise: it seems clear that a tray with
100 nails in it could be referred to successfully with (b), and
that a tray with only one nail in it could not. However it is
not so clear whether (b) could felicitously refer to a tray with,
say, 7 nails in it. The uncertainty is whether our friend would
consider 7 nails “many” nails. Keefe and Smith (and many
others before and after them) would say that the tray with 7
nails is a borderline case of a tray with many nails, in this sit-
uation. Whether a borderline case exists for an expression of
quantity is a kind of litmus test of vagueness, to indicate that
the expression does not describe a well-defined set of objects.
The utility of vagueness: Vagueness as cost reduction
Standard game-theoretic models of communication (e.g.,
Crawford & Sobel, 1982) predict that a precise term is al-
ways preferable to a vague term when the goals of speaker
and listener are in alignment. However, this prediction is at
odds with the observation that much of the language that we
actually use is vague. This contradiction suggests that vague-
ness has some utility that is not properly accounted for in such
models, leading Lipman to pose the question why vagueness
is so common in the language that we use everyday (Lipman,
2009). Van Deemter (2009) suggests the following possible
sources of the utility of vagueness in co-operative situations.
One is local vagueness, where an apparently vague term (like
the tall guy) is rendered precise in context (like the context
of collecting someone from the airport whom one has not
met before), which may save the speaker or hearer the ef-
fort of making a measurement. Sometimes a precise term
(like a temperature of 39.82 Celcius) can convey extraneous
detail: use of a vague term like a high temperature here con-
stitutes information reduction and avoids placing an unneces-
sary processing load on the hearer. Vague terms sometimes
convey elements of evaluation (e.g., expensive). In such ex-
pressions, the evaluative element of the information may con-
stitute utility that a precise expression would lack (Veltman,
2002). A possible benefit for vagueness in cooperative situ-
ations is that vague expressions may be easier for the hearer
to process than precise expressions. For example, Lipman
(2009) writes: “For the listener, information which is too spe-
cific may require more effort to analyze”. We shall refer to
this characterisation of the utility of vague language as the
‘cost reduction hypothesis’, and it is this notion that we ex-
plore in this paper (see also, van Rooij, 2003; Lipman, 2009,
for related ‘cost-based’ arguments).
Applied vagueness: the case of Natural Language Gener-
ation (NLG) NLG systems that generate text from numeri-
cal input must decide between alternative linguistic forms of
the same numerical content, including how vaguly to express
the information. Such systems include Goldberg, Driedger,
& Kittredge (1994); Turner, Sripada, Reiter, & Davy (2006)
in the domain of weather forecasting, given data such as tem-
perature and wind speed; Hripcsak, Elhadad, Chen, Zhou, &
Morrison (2009); Portet et al. (2009) in the domain of medical
decision support, given numerical data such as oxygen satu-
ration, heart rhythm, etc. Currently there is little empirical
data to support NLG decisions about vagueness.
Related empirical work on vagueness Peters et al. (2009)
carried out a series of studies where participants were re-
quired to rate hospitals based on various sources of infor-
mation about quality of care. The format of the information
was manipulated within subjects: either numbers only were
presented, or numbers and evaluative categories (e.g., poor,
fair, good, excellent, with visual boundary lines between the
categories). Certainly, terms like fair admit the possibility
of borderline cases. However, when the visual boundary
lines are taken into account, which map the terms to exact
ranges, it becomes immediately doubtful whether any bor-
derline cases could be conceived to arise in fact. For example
fair is mapped to 60 – 70%: a crisp range.
Bisantz, Marsiglio, & Munch (2005) investigated the ef-
fects of different representations of probabilistic information.
The task was a simulated stock purchase carried out online
over three days. Participants made bets on stock that was ei-
ther profitable or unprofitable, basing their decisions on con-
tinuously updated information that they were supplied with
about the probability that a stock would be profitable. They
manipulated display format and specificity level. An example
of their linguistic expression display format condition is fairly
unlikely. This condition is successfully vague in the sense of
admitting borderline cases, but Bisantz et al. found no effect
of this vagueness.
Mishra, Mishra, & Shiv (2011) manipulated the presenta-
tion format of information about quantities. They compared
information presented as a range with information presented
as a single value at the midpoint of the range (e.g., between
0.5 and 1.5g of cocoa versus 1g of cocoa). Information pre-
sented as a range of values was considered to be vague in-
formation. We note that information presented as an exact
range of values does not conform with the definition of vague-
ness that we use here borrowed from Keefe and Smith (1996),
since an exact range does not have the potential to admit bor-
derline cases. We would prefer to call the difference between
a range and a single midpoint value a difference of granular-
ity or of specificity.
Experiments
We used a forced choice paradigm to elicit response times
and error rates in a task where participants were issued an in-
struction in the form of a referring expression to select a tar-
get object from among distractors. Objects were squares on
screen, containing varying numbers of dots arranged in a pat-
tern that was randomised per-trial. Responses were made via
the keyboard, and button-press latency and response accuracy
were our dependent variables. Participants were students and
staff members at the University of Aberdeen, aged between
18 and 40: there were 25 participants in experiment 1; 20 in
experiment 2; and 30 in experiment 3.
Experiment One
Introduction We hypothesised that participants would re-
spond more quickly, and make fewer errors, in the vague con-
ditions than the precise conditions. This is in line with the hy-
pothesis that vagueness reduces costs for the comprehender.
Method This pilot experiment used small numbers of dots
(fewer than 10 in each of two squares). Pairs of numbers were
{2,4}, {2,6}, {3,5}, {5,9}, {6,8}, {7,3}, {7,9}, {8,4}; pre-
sented equally often in each left-to-right order. An example
stimulus is Figure 1. Per-trial instructions used a referring ex-
pression to indicate one of the squares with reference to the
number of dots it contained, varying whether the instruction
used a crisp or a vague expression of quantity. An example
of a vague instruction is Choose the square with many dots.
An example of a crisp instruction is Choose the square with
seven dots. We wrote each number out in full (seven) rather
than as a numeral (7) because the number words involved did
not differ much in length, and therefore their length would
not contribute much variance to the response measures. At
the start of the experiment, participants were asked to respond
quickly while avoiding errors. The apparatus, for all our ex-
periments, was a MacBook Pro laptop with a 13 inch screen.
The stimuli were presented using GNU Octave (Eaton, 2002)
and the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997).
Figure 1: Stimulus, experiment 1
Results Response time data were preprocessed to remove
outliers and erroneous responses. One trial (0.06% of the
data) was removed because of a programming error that
yielded a negative response time. Three trials (0.18% of the
remaining data) were removed because response times were
greater than our upper limit of 10,000 ms. No response was
less than 250 ms. 40 trials (2.5% of the remaining data) were
removed due to incorrect responses. For the analysis of error
rates, no trials were discarded. One participant was removed
due to not having data in all subconditions. All told, 6.9%
of the trials were removed for the analysis of response times.
There is evidence to suggest that the numerosity of very small
numbers is recognized by a different cognitive mechanism
than the numerosity of larger numbers, and that very small
numbers are recognized extremely quickly without the need
for enumeration (see for example Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994).
That research uses the term “subitizable” to indicate that a
number is recognized in this way, and we adopt the same
nomenclature. Under this scheme, our numbers 1,2,3, and 4
are subitizable, and our numbers 5,6,7,8 and 9 are not subiti-
zable. Results were different depending on whether either of
the squares contained a subitizable number of dots. The three-
way interaction between subitizability, quantity, and vague-
ness was reliable (F(1,23) = 6.65, p < .05). When one square
did contain a subitizable number of dots, the task was ac-
complished faster, and more accurately, when the instruction
used a precise quantifier than when it used a vague quantifier
(see Figure 2). When both numbers of dots were above the
subitizable range, participants were reliably faster to respond
to vague quantifiers (e.g., many dots) than precise quantifiers
(e.g., nine dots), but only when the instruction identified the
larger of the two numbers.
Results for stimuli with a subitizable number of dots

































Figure 2: Results, experiment 1
Discussion We were unable to reject the null hypothesis
that there was no difference between response times and er-
ror rates for the vague and precise instructions. Given the
different patterns of results according to whether the stimulus
included a subitizable number of dots or not, the null effect
seems likely to be due to opposite patterns cancelling each
other out. Because stimuli with a subitizable number of dots
appear to represent a special case due to the specialised cog-
nitive routines that identify these numerosities, we decided to
investigate only non-subitizable numbers in the subsequent
experiments.
Experiment Two
Introduction We hypothesised that vague instructions
would attract faster response times and fewer errors than the
crisp instructions. This is in line with the cost reduction hy-
pothesis.
Method The second experiment used larger numbers of
dots and two squares in a similar experiment to the pilot ex-
periment. Pairs of numbers were: {5, 25} {10, 25} {15, 25}
{20, 25} {30, 25} {35, 25} {40, 25}, and the same pairs in
the other left-to-right-order. All these numbers were above
the subitizable range. Per-trial instructions used a referring
expression to indicate one of the two squares with reference
to the number of dots it contained. An example of a vague
instruction is Choose the square with few dots. An example
of a crisp instruction is Choose the square with 45 dots. We
wrote each number as a numeral (45) rather than in full (forty-
five) in this experiment, because the numbers involved were
larger than in the previous experiment, and we did not want
participants responses to be slowed by longer reading times
for the instructions that had longer words for the number. At
the start of the experiment, participants were asked to respond
quickly while avoiding errors. Experiment two attempted to
get a cleaner index of decision time than the pilot experiment,
by separating off the time taken to read the instruction from
the time taken to choose a square. Participants were required
to press a key after reading the instruction, after which a cen-
tral fixation point was displayed for one second, followed by
the stimulus. See Fig (3) for an example instruction and stim-
ulus. RT comprised only the latency between the presentation
of the stimuli, and the keypress identifying the decision.
Figure 3: Stimulus, experiment 2. Left panel shows instruc-
tion screen, right panel shows stimulus screen
Results We decided not to impose an upper limit on re-
sponse times in this experiment because the numbers of dots
involved were much larger than in experiment one, and we
wanted to allow for the possibility that participants might take
a long time to count them. No response was less than 250
ms. Response times for trials with erroneous responses were
discarded, leading to the loss of 354 trials from 5120, repre-
senting 6.9% of the trials. The results indicated that vague
quantifiers reliably attracted faster accurate response times
and fewer errors than did the crisp quantifiers, for all the com-
binations of numbers that we used. Figure (4) shows mean
response times and error rates, separated out across the levels
of numerical distance between the squares in the stimuli. The
vagueness advantage in this experiment was large, and very
reliable. For response times, the main effect of vagueness was
a 316 ms advantage in the vague conditions (mean crisp: 1246
ms; mean vague: 930 ms, F(1,19) = 12.1, p< .01 in a repeated
measures ANOVA). Mean error rates more than halved in the
vague conditions (mean crisp error rate = 9.3%; mean vague
error rate = 4.5%; Wald z= 2.3, p< .05 in a generalized linear
mixed model as recommended by Jaeger, 2008). Vagueness
brought diminishing returns as the gap size grew larger, until
at the largest gap size, it conferred no advantage relative to
crisp equivalents (see Fig. 4).
Discussion We were able to reject our null hypothesis that
there would be no difference between responses to the vague
and crisp instructions: we found evidence for faster re-
































Figure 4: Results, experiment 2
terpret this difference as an advantage for vagueness.
Experiment Three
Introduction Experiments one and two did not have bor-
derline cases in the stimuli. The vague conditions using
few and many had the potential for vagueness: but it could
be argued that this potential was not realised because there
were only two squares and therefore each vague instruc-
tion uniquely identified a particular square, and ruled out the
other. Therefore it could be argued that the processing advan-
tages that we observed in experiments one and two cannot
have been due to vagueness because there were no borderline
cases.
Experiments one and two did not isolate vagueness from
a possible confound. The vague instructions used the words
few and many. While these are vague, they also refer with-
out using a number. In contrast, the precise instructions used
e.g., five, 20. While these are precise, they also refer using
a number. Therefore our vagueness advantage could be an
advantage for not using a number in the referring expression
instead.
Experiment three set out to remedy these shortcomings:
we made sure that there were borderline cases of the vague
instructions in the stimuli; and we separated the effects of
vagueness from the effects of the absence of a number in the
instructions.
Figure 5: Example stimulus for experiment three
We made sure that there were borderline cases in the stim-
uli by using three squares in the stimulus (see fig 5); as well
as by using indefinite articles in the vague conditions (see Ta-
ble 1). Using the stimulus {16,25,34} and the instruction
Choose a square with about 20 dots as an example, the in-
struction’s scope of application includes the square with 16
dots – this is the closest match for the instruction – but we
argue that it also includes the square with 25 dots, and that
because it is a poorer match, the square with 25 dots consti-
tutes a borderline case (see fig 6).
Figure 6: How borderline cases are construed in experiment
three. Filled numbers represent numbers of dots; non-filled
numbers represent numerical distances
We separated vagueness from non-numerical instructions,
by manipulating vagueness and numerical / non-numerical
format in a 2 x 2 factorial design, yielding four subconditions
as follow, and as tabled in Table (1): number-crisp (Choose
the square with 16 dots); number-vague (Choose a square
with about 20 dots); word-crisp (Choose the square with the
fewest dots); word-vague (Choose a square with few dots).
The crisp subconditions used definite articles; the vague sub-
conditions used indefinite articles. The crisp subconditions
used either a specific number or a superlative quantifier to in-
dicate strictly one object. The vague subconditions used the
expressions about n and few to plausibly indicate more than
one object, but with strictly one object as the best match, leav-
ing the other plausible referent as the borderline case that is
at the heart of the interpretation of vagueness that we pursue
here.
Table 1: Examples of instructions used in Experiment 3.
“Choose . . . square with . . . ”
Crisp Vague
Number . . . the . . . {16, 34} dots . . . a . . . about {20, 30} dots
Word . . . the . . . the {fewest, most} dots . . . a . . . {few, many} dots
This design allows us to pit our hypothesis (i.e., vagueness
reduces processing costs) against the competing hypothesis
(i.e., numbers in referring expressions incur processing penal-
ties). The cost reduction hypothesis predicts that the process-
ing advantage that we observed in experiment two will persist
both at numerical and at non-numerical levels of the format
manipulation (i.e., a main effect of vagueness). In contrast
the number penalty hypothesis predicts that processing ad-
vantages will manifest in the no-number conditions regard-
less whether they are crisp or vague (i.e., a main effect of
format).
Method We used the following triples representing num-
ber of dots in each of 3 squares: {6,15,24}, {16,25,34},
{26,35,44}, {36,45,54}, and the same triples in differ-
ent left-to-right order. {24,15,6}, {34,25,16}, {44,35,26},
{54,45,36}. The reason for presenting each triple in both
left to right orders was to counter-balance facilitation for re-
sponding to a small number when it is presented on the left
(Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993).
Results Responses were preprocessed as follows. No re-
sponse was treated as erroneous because errors were essen-
tially undefined for the vague conditions. 2 trials were ex-
cluded because they had response time (RT) less than 250ms
and must therefore have been planned before the stimulus ap-
peared, and 1 trial was excluded because it had RT greater
than 50,000 ms. This excluded less than 0.1% of data points.
Response times were submitted to 2-way within-subjects
ANOVA with repeated measures on both vagueness and in-
struction format. We found a reliable main effect of instruc-
tion format (word vs number format) on response times: re-
sponses were 1862 ms faster in the word conditions com-
pared with the number conditions (3773 ms vs 1911 ms;
F(1,29) = 13.4, p < .01). We found no main effect of vague-
ness on response times, indicating that mean response time
in the vague conditions did not differ reliably from mean re-
sponse time in the crisp conditions. We found no reliable
vagueness x format interaction for response times (See Fig
7). This indicates that there was no reliable additional bene-
fit for vagueness either in the no-number conditions or in the
number conditions.



























































Figure 7: Results for experiment three. Response time in left
panel, proportion of trials on which a borderline case was the
response in right panel.
The choice of the borderline response (a binary value, cho-
sen vs not-chosen) was analysed with a generalized linear
mixed model using a binomial link function (Jaeger, 2008).
This measure serves as an analogue of the erroneous re-
sponse measure in the previous experiments. To choose the
borderline response in the crisp conditions is erroneous: in
the vague conditions it indicates that the participant did not
choose the closest match for the instruction. The vagueness
and format manipulations both exerted reliable influences in
their own right for choosing the borderline response. Par-
ticipants were reliably more likely to choose the borderline
square for vague instructions - when the borderline response
was not strictly an error - than for crisp instructions (21.9%
vs 11.3%,Wald z = 12.5, p < .001). Participants were more
likely to choose the borderline response for numerical than
for word format (30.1% vs 3.0%,Wald z =−14.8, p < .001).
Numerical format instructions had a scope of application
symmetric about the number and included the borderline
case, whereas the scope of application of the word format
instructions was skewed higher or lower than the declared
quantity1. The nature of the unreliable vagueness x format in-
teraction was that symmetric number-vague conditions (e.g.,
about 20) attracted the most borderline responses, with sym-
metric number-precise (e.g., 34) conditions attracting increas-
ingly more such responses as the size of the number grew;
and both the asymmetric word conditions (e.g., few, fewest)
attracting hardly any such responses.
Discussion Experiment three successfully teased apart
vagueness from word vs number format. It also successfully
ensured that the vague expressions were still vague when
taken in context with the stimulus. It provided an appropriate
arena for rejecting the null hypothesis that there is no differ-
ence between crisp and vague referring expressions, in terms
on response speed and accuracy. It also provided an opportu-
nity for any advantage for verbal format as opposed to numer-
ical format to manifest itself. The findings from experiment
three indicate that while it is still true that word-vague in-
structions are advantageous over number-precise instructions
(as found previously in experiment two), when vagueness and
format are manipulated factorially (as in experiment three),
this advantage is revealed to be an advantage for the word
format rather than for vagueness.
General Discussion
Vagueness in a referring expression is a combination of the
referring expression’s potential for borderline cases; and the
specific situation in which the referring expression is used.
We found that expressions with the potential for vagueness
attracted faster response times than expressions without; but
only when the referent set did not allow the possibility of
borderline cases. When the referent set did allow borderline
cases, precise expressions that used no numbers performed
just as well as vague expression that used no numbers; and
precise expressions that did use numbers performed just as
well as vague expressions that used numbers. Vagueness does
exert advantageous effects, but it uses non-numerical format
to do the heavy lifting.
Rayna & Brainerd (1989) proposed that reasoners encode
representations at different levels of precision, and that rea-
soning operated at the lowest level that would allow one to
accompish the task. The different levels can be described in
terms of how many distinctions need to be made between ob-
jects in order to accomplish the task. A specific number re-
1 few in the context of {16,25,34} has an asymmetric scope of
application equal to or lower than 16, but no higher than 16; about
20 has a scope of application symmetric about 20 that includes both
16 and 25
quires one to draw many distinctions (9 must be distinguished
from all cases of not-9). A term like large requires fewer dis-
tinctions - the objects must be divided into two sets, large
and small. A term like some lives allows a boolean classifica-
tion: either # lives = 0; or # lives > 0. Since non-numerical
terms usually require fewer distinctions to be made, we sug-
gest that one way in which non-numerical quantifiers might
exert a beneficial influence is that they flag up for comprehen-
ders that a lower, less cognitively demanding, level of reason-
ing might suffice for the task at hand, which would spare them
the overhead of marshalling more expensive resources.
Dual process models of decision making (e.g., Sloman,
2007) propose two systems of processing: the quick and af-
fective System 1 and the deliberative and rule-based System
2. This two-systems account can explain our finding of di-
minishing returns for vagueness in experiment 2. When the
gap is small, participants use System 2 (slow, deliberative)
for the precise instructions. When the gap is large, they take a
shortcut for the precise conditions and merely establish which
square is more (or less) numerous, using System 1 (quick,
heuristic). In the vague conditions, they use the heuristic sys-
tem whether the gap is small or large. This account explains
the diminishing returns for vagueness that we observed in
terms of a change of strategy in the baseline precise condi-
tions as the gap size grew larger.
Conclusions
Although our experiments were limited in focussing on
vagueness in descriptive noun phrases only, and although they
did show up advantages for certain vague expressions, they
do more to cast doubt on the cost reduction hypothesis than
to confirm it. NLG systems can condense our findings into a
rule that says that for numbers less than 5, a precise term will
be easier for the comprehender than a vague term, and for
numbers greater than 5, terms (whether vague or crisp) that
do not mention numbers will be easier than terms (whether
vague or crisp) that do, when the numerical distance from
distractors is small, with diminishing returns for vagueness
as the distance grows larger.
Acknowledgments
This work was funded in part by an EPSRC Platform Grant
awarded to the NLG group at Aberdeen.
References
Bisantz, A., Marsiglio, S., & Munch, J. (2005). Displaying
uncertainty: Investigating the effects of display format and
specificity. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human
Factors and Ergonomics Society, 47(4), 777.
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spatial
Vision, 10, 433–436.
Crawford, V. P., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information
transmission. Econometrica, 50(6), 1431–1451.
Dehaene, S., Bossini, S., & Giraux, P. (1993). The mental
representation of parity and number magnitude. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 122(3), 371.
Eaton, J. W. (2002). GNU Octave Manual. Network Theory
Limited.
Goldberg, E., Driedger, N., & Kittredge, R. (1994). Using
natural-language processing to produce weather forecasts.
IEEE Expert, 9(2), 45–53.
Hripcsak, G., Elhadad, N., Chen, Y., Zhou, L., & Morrison,
F. P. (2009). Using Empiric Semantic Correlation to In-
terpret Temporal Assertions in Clinical Texts. Journal of
the American Medical Informatics Association, 16(2), 220-
227.
Jaeger, T. (2008). Categorical data analysis: Away from
ANOVAs (transformation or not) and towards logit mixed
models. Journal of Memory and Language, 59(4), 434–
446.
Keefe, R., & Smith, P. (Eds.). (1996). Vagueness: a Reader.
A Bradford Book. The MIT Press.
Lipman, B. L. (2009). Why is Language Vague? (re-
trieved 12 April 2011 from http://people.bu.edu/
blipman/Papers/vague5.pdf)
Mishra, H., Mishra, A., & Shiv, B. (2011). In Praise of Vague-
ness: Malleability of Vague Information as a Performance-
Booster. Psychological Science.
Peters, E., Dieckmann, N., Va¨stfja¨ll, D., Mertz, C., Slovic,
P., & Hibbard, J. (2009). Bringing meaning to numbers:
The impact of evaluative categories on decisions. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 15(3), 213.
Portet, F., Reiter, E., Gatt, A., Hunter, J., Sripada, S., Freer,
Y., et al. (2009). Automatic generation of textual sum-
maries from neonatal intensive care data. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 173(7-8), 789–816.
Rayna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1989). Fuzzy-trace theory
of framing effects in choice. In Proceedings of the 30th
Annual Meeting of the Psychonomic Society. Atlanta, GA.
Sloman, S. (2007). Two systems of reasoning. In T. Gilovich,
D. Griffin, & D.Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics and Biases:
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment. CUP.
Trick, L., & Pylyshyn, Z. (1994). Why are small and large
numbers enumerated differently? A limited-capacity preat-
tentive stage in vision. Psychological Review, 101, 80–
102.
Turner, R., Sripada, S., Reiter, E., & Davy, I. (2006). Gen-
erating spatio-temporal descriptions in pollen forecasts. In
EACL ’06: Proceedings (pp. 163–166). Stroudsburg, PA:
Association for Computational Linguistics.
van Deemter, K. (2009). Utility and Language Generation:
The Case of Vagueness. Journal of Philosophical Logic,
38(6), 607–632.
van Rooij, R. (2003). Being polite is a handicap: Towards
a game theoretic analysis of polite linguistic behavior. In
M. Tenneholz (Ed.), TARK 9: Theoretical Aspects of Ra-
tionality and Knowledge. Bloomington: Bloomington.
Veltman, F. (2002). Het verschil tussen ‘vaag’ en ‘niet pre-
cies’. (the difference between ‘vague’ and ‘not precise’.).
Inaugural lecture, Vossiuspers, University of Amsterdam.
